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Abstract
We examine a two-stage duopoly game in which firms advertise their existence to consumers
in stage 1 and compete in prices in stage 2. Whenever the advertising technology generates pos-
itive overlap in customer bases, the equilibrium for the stage-1 game is asymmetric in that one
firm chooses to remain small in comparison to its competitor. For a specific random advertising
technology, we show that one firm will always be half as large as the other. No pure-strategy price
equilibrium exists in the stage-2 game, and as long as there is some overlap in customer bases, the
mixed-strategy price equilibrium does not converge to the Bertrand equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Before a customer can contemplate the decision to buy a good from a particular
firm he or she must be aware that the firm exists. Indeed, one of the more impor-
tant functions of a firm’s advertising effort is to inform potential customers of its
existence. Intuitively, it seems reasonable that firms would want to be known by as
many customers as is economically possible.
That this intuition is flawed can be seen by considering a situation in which
there are two newly established firms, A and B, capable of serving the market for
some new product. Clearly the firms would want to inform potential customers of
their existence. If, through advertising, they were to create identical customer bases,
price competition between the firms would be fierce, dissipating much or all of the
market’s potential profit. In contrast, if they were able to create customer bases that
did not overlap completely, so that some customers knew only of firm A and others
knew only of firm B, both firms would enjoy a degree of market power, and would
be able to earn at least some profit. Thus it may make sense for the firms to limit
and/or target their advertising efforts if by doing so they are able to manage the
overlap in their customer bases. We examine this possibility in a duopoly setting
when the firms are able to influence the size and the degree of overlap of their
customer bases through their advertising efforts.
Our firms produce identical goods, and their marginal costs are constant and
identical. Potential customers have identical demand functions. Any customer who
knows of both firms patronizes the firm offering the lower price, and any customer
who knows of just one firm patronizes that firm. Competition is modeled as a
two-stage game: in stage 1 firms advertise their existence, thereby creating their
customer bases and the overlap between them, and in stage 2 they choose prices.
We find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the two-stage game using the
familiar backward-induction algorithm.
In Section 2 we develop the equilibrium of the stage-2 price game, given
arbitrary customer bases and overlap. It is well known that when the overlap of the
customer bases of two firms is incomplete, no pure-strategy price equilibrium exists
but a mixed-strategy equilibrium does exist (see for example Varian, 1980, Burdett
and Judd, 1983, Narasimhan, 1988 and Baye and Morgan, 2001). In the mixed-
strategy price equilibrium of our model, the firms randomize over a set of prices
where the upper bound is the monopoly price and the lower bound is a function of
the monopoly price and the extent of the overlap between the customer bases. The
expected equilibrium price is decreasing in the degree of overlap, and increasing in
the degree of asymmetry between the sizes of the customer bases.
In Section 3, we examine the firms’ stage-1 advertising decisions given an
advertising technology that we refer to as the random advertising technology – cus-
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tomer bases are generated by random sampling with replacement from the entire
population of potential customers, and the marginal cost of a draw from the popula-
tion is constant. With the random advertising technology, there are two asymmetric
pure-strategy equilibria of the stage-1 customer-base game and in each the customer
base of the smaller firm is one half that of the larger firm. It is always the case that
the expected prices of both firms in the corresponding stage-2 price equilibrium are
large relative to the marginal cost of production – so, with the random advertising
technology, by managing the overlap in their customer bases our firms rig an equi-
librium that has little resemblance to the Bertrand equilibrium where competition
drives price down to marginal cost.
In Section 4 we generalize the asymmetry result, and in Section 5 we present
additional results for a special case in which customers have a common reservation
price rather than a common demand curve and firms use the random advertising
technology.
Our work builds on a pioneering paper that has not received the attention
that it deserves. Ireland (1993) finds that when two firms who sell identical goods
can costlessly advertise to a population of previously uninformed customers, one
firm will advertise to all potential customers and the other firm will advertise to
half of them. This results in half of all customers being captive to the large firm
and a mixed-strategy price equilibrium where firms put positive probability on all
prices between [R2 ,R], where R is the reservation price common to all customers.
Ireland extends the duopoly model to an n-firm oligopoly and finds that in equi-
librium there will be one large firm that advertises to all customers and (n− 1)
equally sized smaller firms that advertise to only part of the population. We extend
Ireland’s duopoly model by examining costly advertising with both a random ad-
vertising technology and a general advertising technology. As regards the random
advertising technology, we find that in equilibrium the size of either firm’s customer
base is inversely related to the ratio of the marginal cost of a draw from the pop-
ulation of customers and the per-customer monopoly revenue, and that the larger
firm’s customer base is always twice that of the smaller firm in a pure-strategy equi-
librium. Moreover, the lower bound of the resulting equilibrium price distribution
and the magnitude of the expected prices are positively related to this cost-revenue
ratio. Ireland’s advertising technology is a special case of our random advertising
technology in which the marginal cost of an additional draw from the population of
customers is zero. As regards the general advertising technology we get a strong
result: the pure-strategy customer-base equilibria are asymmetric if there is positive
probability that a single customer will be in both customer bases. In other words,
if it is not possible to target customers perfectly, the pure-strategy customer-base
equilibria are asymmetric.
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influence the nature of price competition in stage 2. We find that the smaller firm has
a strong incentive to, in effect, hide from some of the potential customers in order to
manage overlap in customer bases and hence price competition in the stage-2 price
game. Others have demonstrated a similar incentive to take action in stage 1 to
lessen price competition in stage 2. For example, in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
firms choose capacities in stage 1 in order to credibly commit to smaller output and
therefore above marginal cost prices in stage 2. Similarly, Fudenberg and Tirole
(1984) show that an incumbent has an incentive to engage in pre-entry advertising
to create loyal customers in order to soften the price competition upon entry. In
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1986), firms choose qualities before entering into
price competition, which gives rise to maximum differentiation in qualities in stage
1 and above marginal cost prices in stage 2.
A seminal paper in advertising by Butters (1977) examines a situation where
customers become aware of the existence of firms only through random advertis-
ing. If informed, customers purchase at most one unit of the good from the firm
advertising the lowest price. Butters looks at the cumulative distribution of adver-
tised prices and sale prices in the market, the latter taking into account that each
customer chooses the lowest price advertised to her. His focus is on the market
and not on the behavior of individual firms, which is our focus. Our equilibrium is
asymmetric whereas his is symmetric. Hence, his equilibrium price support, when
applied to two firms, is quite different from ours. However, comparative static re-
sults for the models are similar in that we both find that the expected transaction
price is decreasing in the cost of advertising and that, in the limit as the marginal
cost of informing an additional customer approaches zero, all customers buy the
good.
McAfee (1994) generalizes Butters by separating the firms’ choices of prod-
uct availability and pricing into a two-stage process. McAfee’s product availabil-
ity can intuitively be thought of as shelf space in stores that are located in malls.
McAfee shows that the equilibrium availability rates are asymmetric across firms
such that there is one large firm and (n− 1) equally sized small firms and derives
the equilibrium mixed strategies for prices. In this way McAfee’s model is closer to
Ireland and us than it is to Butters. We differ from McAfee in that we focus on how
the choice of advertising technology affects the price equilibrium whereas McAfee
focuses on cartel formation and mergers. Grossman and Shapiro (1984) examine
existence advertising and the resulting price competition when goods are differen-
tiated. Iyer, Soberman and Villas-Boas (2005) study the choice of uniform versus
targeted advertising when customers are differentiated in their buying behaviour.
In our model firms make irreversible advertising decisions in stage 1 that
3
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2 The Stage-2 Pricing Problem
If one or both firms in a duopoly have captive customers, it is well known that the
price game has no pure-strategy equilibrium but that it does have a mixed-strategy
equilibrium. With the exception of a possible mass point at the highest price,
the mixed-strategy equilibrium consists of continuous probability density functions
over a continuum of prices. Several authors have derived equilibrium price den-
sity functions for different models (see for example Narasimhan, 1988, Ireland,
1993 and McAfee, 1994). There are some commonalities. The upper bound of the
equilibrium price support is the monopoly price. The lower bound is the price at
which the larger firm is indifferent between selling to its captive customers at the
monopoly price and selling to all the customers who know of it at the lower bound.
Alternatively, the lower bound is equal to the product of the monopoly price and
the proportion of captive or loyal customers amongst those who know of the larger
firm. All firms randomize over a common set of prices with the exception of the
upper bound of the distribution where the larger firm, if one exists, has a mass point
and the smaller firm has zero density. No other mass points exist.
Obviously, details of the mixed-strategy equilibrium depend on the assump-
tions made and especially the notation used. We write the equilibrium mixed strate-
gies used by the firms in our model as functions of the proportions of the two firms’
customers that are captive. These proportions depend on the degree of overlap in
the firms’ customer bases, which in turn depend on the advertising technology used
to build the customer bases. Our notation allows us to derive some interesting re-
sults about the effect of the advertising technology on the price equilibrium in a
straightforward way.
2.1 Notation
There are two firms competing to sell a homogeneous good and many potential
customers. Each of these potential customers demands a quantity Q(p) from the
firm offering the lowest price amongst the firms whose existence they know of. We
assume that the associated per-customer revenue function,
R(p)≡ pQ(p), (1)
is continuous and single peaked.1 Then, letting p denote the price at which R(p)
attains its maximum value, we see that R(p) is an increasing function of p on the
interval [0, p].
1In fact neither continuity nor single peakedness are necessary for the main results we establish
in this section, but for expositional purposes they are convenient.
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It is convenient to think in terms of a larger and a smaller firm, so we index
firms by L and S. The number of customers who know of firms L and S are NL and
NS, respectively, and the number of customers who know of both firms is M. We
assume that NL ≥ NS ≥ M ≥ 0. The number of customers who know of firm S but
not firm L is NS−M and the number of customers who know of firm L but not firm
S is NL−M. The M customers that know of both firms are, of course, up for grabs,
but the willingness of firms to cut price to grab them is conditioned by the fact that
they have captive customers who are unaware of the other firm.
Customers who know of just one firm patronize that firm. Customers who
know of both firms patronize the firm with the lower price if prices differ, and if
prices are identical they randomly choose one firm or the other, with equal proba-
bility. For convenience we assume that the constant marginal costs of the firms are
equal to zero. Firms maximize expected profit, which is equal to expected revenue
given that marginal cost is zero.
The proportions of the larger and smaller firms’ customers who are captive
are
λL ≡
NL−M
NL
and λS ≡
NS−M
NS
. (2)
Define the maximized per-customer monopoly revenue as
R ≡ R(p). (3)
Define price p as the price that makes the larger firm indifferent between selling to
all the customers who know of it at price p and selling only to its captive customers
at price p:
R(p)≡ λLR. (4)
To derive certain results we consider a special case that we call the unit-
demand case:
Q(p) =
{
1 if p ≤ R
0 if p > R. (5)
In the unit-demand case, the per-customer revenue function is
R(p)≡
{
p if p ≤ R
0 if p > R. (6)
Both the monopoly price and the per-customer monopoly revenue equal R.
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2.2 The Mixed-Strategy Price Equilibrium
If the customer bases are the same size (NL = NS), in the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium2 both firms put positive probability on all prices in [p, p]. If the customer bases
are unequal (NL > NS), the larger firm randomizes on the closed interval [p, p] with
a mass point at p = p, and the smaller firm randomizes on the open interval [p, p).
The equilibrium cumulative density function (CDF) for the smaller firm is
FS(p) =
{
0 if p < p
1
1−λL
(
1− λLRR(p)
)
if p ≤ p ≤ p (7)
and for the larger firm it is
FL(p) =

0 if p < p
1
1−λS
(
1− λLRR(p)
)
if p ≤ p < p
1 if p = p.
(8)
Notice that when NS < NL, there is a mass point at p in the larger firm’s density
function – the probability that pL = p is λL−λS1−λS , and the remainder of the probability
mass is distributed over the half open interval, [p, p).
The equilibrium expected profits are
Π∗L = λLNLR (9)
for the larger firm and
Π∗S = λLNSR (10)
for the smaller firm.
2.3 Comments on the Mixed-Strategy Price Equilibrium
Since firms compete over the M customers who know of both firms, comparative
statics with respect to M are of considerable interest. Naturally, as M increases
expected prices and profits decrease. In fact, expected profits decrease linearly at
the rate R for the larger firm and at the rate NLNS R for the smaller firm. In the limit,
as M approaches 0, we have two monopolists with prices equal to p enjoying full
monopoly profits, Π∗L = NLR and Π∗S = NSR. When M approaches its upper bound,
NS, equilibrium profits approach Π∗L =
(
1− NSNL
)
NLR and Π∗S =
(
1− NSNL
)
NSR.
2The mixed-strategy equilibrium is derived in Appendix A.
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If the firms are of equal size, that is if NL = NS = N, equilibrium profits and
prices go to zero as M approaches its upper bound, N. So in the symmetric case,
as M transits the [0,N] interval there is a smooth transition from the monopoly out-
come where expected prices are p to the Bertrand outcome where expected prices
are 0.
If the firms are of unequal size, however, as M approaches its upper limit,
NS, equilibrium profits persist and the model does not converge to the Bertrand
outcome. For example, if the smaller firm’s customer base is half that of the larger
firm, equilibrium profits of the two firms converge to one half their monopoly levels
as M approaches its upper bound. In fact, 1− NSNL can be regarded as the upper bound
on the degree of competitiveness of this model because the profits of the firms can
be no less than
(
1− NSNL
)
percent of full monopoly profits.
Of course, in the larger picture both the sizes of the customer bases (NL and
NS) and the degree of overlap (M) are endogenous. We turn to this problem in the
next section. It is clear, however, that foresighted firms will understand that both
overlap and the degree of asymmetry in customer bases have significant impacts on
equilibrium prices and will take this into account when choosing customer bases.
For future purposes, let us record some precise results with respect to ex-
pected per-customer revenue as well as expected prices in equilibrium.
Result 1. In equilibrium, the expected per-customer revenue of the smaller firm is
E(R(pS)) =−
λL ln(λL)R
1−λL
, (11)
and the expected per-customer revenue of the larger firm is
E(R(pL)) =
(λL−λS−λL ln(λL))R
1−λS
. (12)
For the unit-demand case, the expected prices of the smaller firm and the larger firm
are simply E(pS) = E(R(pS)) and E(pL) = E(R(pL)), respectively, the expected
minimum price is
E (min(pL, pS)) =
λLR
1−λS
(
2+ λL +λS
1−λL
ln(λL)
)
, 3 (13)
and the expected transaction price is
ET P =
λL(2−λL−λS)R
1−λLλS
.4 (14)
3E (min(pL, pS)) =
∫ p
pS=p
∫ p
pL=p (pL fL(pL)(1−FS(pL))+ pS fS(pS)(1−FL(pS)))d pLd pS, where
fL(pL) = λL1−λS
(
R
p2L
)
and fS(pS) = λL1−λL
(
R
p2S
)
.
4ET P = NL−MNL+NS−M E(pL)+
NS−M
NL+NS−M E(pS)+
M
NL+NS−M E (min(pL, pS)).
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3 The Stage-1 Customer-Base Game with Random
Advertising Technology
In our duopoly model, firms compete in a two-stage game: in stage 1 firms create
their customer bases and the overlap between them through their advertising efforts,
and in stage 2 they choose prices. The mixed-strategy equilibrium presented in the
previous section is, of course, the equilibrium of the stage-2 price game. In this
section we focus exclusively on the pure-strategy equilibria of the stage-1 game,
ignoring any mixed-strategy equilibria that may exist.
We posit a population of size H, composed of ex ante identical potential
customers. There is an advertising technology that allows firms to manage their
customer bases by varying their expenditure on advertising. We assume that ini-
tially all the potential customers know nothing about the firms and become aware
of them only through the firms’ advertising efforts. In this section we work with
an advertising technology that allows us to generate closed form solutions for the
stage-1 game. We consider more general technologies in Section 4.
3.1 The Random Advertising Technology
We denote the cost of making one’s firm known to N ≤H of the potential customers
by the function A(N). It is natural to suppose that A is increasing and convex in N
and that marginal cost, A′(N), is a decreasing function of population size, H. Given
NL and NS, what should we assume about M, the overlap in the two customer bases?
If both NL and NS are small relative to H it seems likely that there will be very little
overlap, whereas if both are large relative to H there will inevitably be substantial
overlap. It also seems sensible to suppose that the overlap is an increasing function
of both NL and NS. The random advertising technology we lay out below exhibits
these properties.
We assume that customer bases are generated by random drawings with
replacement from the entire population of potential customers, and that each draw
costs v, where v ∈ (0,R). The model is uninteresting when v ≥ R, since the cost of
getting a customer is greater than or equal to the maximum revenue the firm could
generate from the customer.
Suppose a firm’s customer base is initially N. Then, since new customers are
generated by drawing with replacement from the population of size H, the proba-
bility that an additional draw from the distribution yields a customer that is not
already in the firm’s customer base is H−NH . The expected number of additional
draws needed to get a new customer is HH−N . Since each draw costs v the marginal
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cost of an additional customer is vHH−N . That is,
A′(N) =
vH
H −N
.
Then, integrating the marginal cost function yields the cost function
A(N) = vH[ln(H)− ln(H −N)].
Notice that A(N) is increasing and strictly convex in N, and that A′(N) is a decreas-
ing function of the population size, H.
Given that customer bases are generated in this manner, any particular per-
son in the population is just as likely to be included in a firm’s customer base as is
any other person. So, the probability that any person in firm i’s customer base is
also included in firm j’s customer base is N jH and the expected overlap in customer
bases is
M =
NLNS
H
. (15)
If both NL and NS are small relative to H, there will be very little overlap, if both are
large relative to H there will be substantial overlap, and the overlap is an increasing
function of both NL and NS.
3.2 Stage-1 Objective Functions
In our two-stage game, firms simultaneously choose customer bases in stage 1 and
price distributions in stage 2. A firm’s stage-1 objective function is therefore the
expected profit that it will earn in the stage-2 price game minus the cost of creating
the customer base in stage 1.
Clearly a firm’s expected profit in the stage-2 mixed-strategy equilibrium is
a function of the stage-1 choices of customer bases, NL and NS. Given the random
advertising technology, M = NLNSH , so
λL ≡
NL−M
NL
= 1− NS
H
.
Of course, λL is the proportion of people in the larger firm’s customer base who are
captive – that is, who know nothing of the smaller firm. Notice that λL is completely
9
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determined by NS and H. From (9) and (10), the expected profits of the two firms
in the stage-2 price game are then
Π∗S = λLNSR =
(
1−
NS
H
)
NSR (16)
and
Π∗L = λLNLR =
(
1− NS
H
)
NLR. (17)
For the larger firm, the marginal value of an additional person in its customer base
is independent of its choice variable, NL, whereas for the smaller firm, the marginal
value of an additional person in its customer base is a decreasing function of its
choice variable, NS.
Using these results, and changing notation so as to allow either firm to be
the larger or the smaller firm, we see that the stage-1 objective function of firm i,
Vi(Ni,N j), is the following:
Vi(Ni,N j) =

(
1− NiH
)
NiR−A(Ni) if Ni ≤ N j(
1− N jH
)
NiR−A(Ni) if Ni ≥ N j.
(18)
3.3 Concavity of the Stage-1 Objective Functions
In choosing its customer base, firm i must contemplate two regimes, the LT regime
where Ni ≤ N j and the GT regime where Ni ≥ N j. In the LT regime,
∂Vi(Ni,N j)
∂Ni
=
(
1−
2Ni
H
)
R−
vH
H−Ni
(19)
∂ 2Vi(Ni,N j)
∂N2i
= −
2R
H
−
vH
(H−Ni)2
< 0, (20)
and in the GT regime,
∂Vi(Ni,N j)
∂Ni
=
(
1−
N j
H
)
R−
vH
H −Ni
(21)
∂ 2Vi(Ni,N j)
∂N2i
= −
vH
(H −Ni)2
< 0. (22)
Equations (19)-(22) show that within each of these regimes firm i’s objective func-
tion is strictly concave in Ni. However, across the two regimes, firm i’s objective
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function is not concave. When Ni = N j, the the marginal value of Ni in the LT
regime in (19) is smaller than its marginal value in the GT regime in (21):(
1−
2N j
H
)
R−
vH
H −N j
<
(
1−
N j
H
)
R−
vH
H −N j
. (23)
This, of course, means that over the two regimes, firm i’s objective function is not
concave. The objective function is illustrated in Figure 1 for four different values
of N j. Firm i’s objective function is continuous in Ni, but it is kinked at Ni = N j; in
some neighborhood centered on the kink, ∂Vi(Ni,N j)∂Ni is smaller in the LT regime that
it is in the GT regime.
The non-concavity implies that there are no symmetric pure-strategy equi-
libria. Suppose to the contrary that there was a symmetric pure-strategy equilib-
rium, N∗i = N∗j = N∗. For this to be an equilibrium, it must the case that N∗ is a best
response to N∗. Supposing that N∗j = N∗, this requires that
(
1− 2N∗H
)
R ≥ vHH−N∗ ,
otherwise firm i’s best response in the LT regime would be some Ni < N∗, and that(
1− N∗H
)
R ≤ vHH−N∗ , otherwise firm i’s best response in the GT regime would be
some Ni > N∗. Obviously, it is impossible to satisfy both inequalities simultane-
ously so we have a result.
Result 2. Given the random advertising technology, there is no symmetric pure-
strategy equilibrium in the customer-base game.
3.4 The Pure-Strategy Equilibria of the Customer-Base Game
For clarity, we focus on firm i’s best-response function, BRi(N j), because the best-
response function of the other firm is symmetric. The basic features of BRi(N j) are
apparent from Figure 1. The derivation is, however, rather cumbersome so we leave
it to Appendix B.
Result 3. The best-response function of firm i is given by
BRi(N j) =
{
Φ(N j) if N j ≤ N˜
∆1 if N j ≥ N˜. (24)
Φ(N j) satisfies ∂Vi(Ni=Φ(N j),N j)∂Ni = 0 in the GT regime and is given by
Φ(N j)≡ H
(
1−
v
R
H
H −N j
)
. (25)
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Ni
Vi(Ni,N j)
N j
∆1 φ(N j)
V GTi (N j)
N˜
a: N j < ∆1: N∗i = φ(N j)
Ni
Vi(Ni,N j)
N j
∆1 N˜ φ(N j)
V GTi (N j)
b: ∆1 < N j < N˜ < φ(N j): N∗i = φ(N j)
Ni
Vi(Ni,N j)
N j
∆1
V LTi
N˜ φ(N j)
c: ∆1 < N˜ < N j < φ(N j): N∗i = ∆1
Ni
Vi(Ni,N j)
N j∆1
V LTi
φ(N j)
N˜
d: φ(N j) < N j: N∗i = ∆1
Figure 1: Stage-1 objective function of firm i for four different values of N j. Parts a
and b: Firm i chooses N∗i = φ(N j) > N j when N j < N˜. Parts c and d: Firm i chooses
N∗i = ∆1 < N j when N j > N˜.
12
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 10 [2010], Iss. 1 (Contributions), Art. 39
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol10/iss1/art39
∆1 is the value of N j that satisfies ∂Vi(Ni=N j,N j)∂Ni = 0 in the LT regime and is given by
∆1 ≡ H
(
3
4
−
1
4
√
1+8 v
R
)
. (26)
N˜ is the value of N j such that V GTi (N˜)≡V LTi and is implicitly defined by
Φ(N˜)
(
1−
N˜
H
)
R− vH[ln(H)− ln(H−Φ(N˜))] =
∆1
(
1−
∆1
H
)
R− vH[ln(H)− ln(H −∆1)]. (27)
When N j is small (less than N˜), firm i wants to be large and it maximizes
profit by choosing N∗i = φ(N j). This is illustrated in cases a and b in Figure 1. Con-
versely, when N j is large (greater than N˜), firm i wants to be small and it maximizes
profit by choosing N∗i = ∆1. Notice that ∆1 is independent of N j. This is illustrated
in cases c and d in Figure 1. N˜ is, of course, the value of N j such that V LTi ≡V GTi .
We have plotted the best-response functions in Figure 2. Notice that there
are two pure-strategy equilibria. In each the smaller customer base is ∆1 and the
larger customer base is Φ(∆1) = 2∆1. So, in a pure-strategy equilibrium the larger
customer base is twice the smaller customer base.5 It is worth noting that one of
the equilibria is also the Stackelberg equilibrium in a game where the firms choose
their customer bases sequentially in stage 1 and choose prices simultaneously in
stage 2. The leader chooses to be the larger firm with customer base 2∆1 and the
follower chooses to be the smaller firm with customer base ∆1.
Result 4. In the subgame perfect pure-strategy equilibrium, the customer base of
the smaller firm, N∗S , is
N∗S = ∆1 = HΩ, (28)
and the customer base of the larger firm, N∗L , is
N∗L = 2∆1 = 2HΩ, (29)
where
Ω ≡ 3
4
−
1
4
√
1+8 v
R
. (30)
5When advertising is costless, the larger firm targets the entire population and the smaller firm
targets half of the population. This result was shown by Ireland (1993).
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a
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∆1
φ(∆1) = 2∆1
φ(∆1) = 2∆1
∆1
N˜
N˜
Figure 2: Best-response functions and the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the
stage-1 customer-base game
The composite parameter Ω is the equilibrium proportion of the total popu-
lation that is in the smaller firm’s customer base. It is inversely related to the ratio
v
R , and given that 0 <
v
R < 1, 0 < Ω <
1
2 . Of course, 2Ω is the equilibrium propor-
tion of the total population that is in the larger firm’s customer base. As the cost
of sending a message to a customer, v, approaches R, the ratio vR approaches 1, Ω
approaches 0, and both customer bases go to 0. As vR approaches 0, Ω approaches
1
2 and in this limit the smaller firm targets half the population and the larger firm
targets the entire population.6
In choosing its customer base, firm i faces conflicting incentives. It can
keep the overlap in customer bases small and therefore the expected price high by
choosing a small customer base. But it can sell more by choosing a large customer
base. When firm j’s customer base is large (N j > N˜), the first incentive dominates
6In Section 5 we show that in the special case of unit demand, the equilibrium is efficient in
the sense that the number of customers who are in at least one firm’s customer base is equal to the
socially optimal number of informed customers.
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and firm i chooses to be small to keep the expected price high. And, when firm j’s
customer base is small (N j < N˜), the second incentive dominates and firm i chooses
to be large.
3.5 Prices
Now let us explore the stage-2 price equilibrium associated with the equilibrium
customer bases. Here, we normalize all measures by dividing them by R.
Result 5. In the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, the normalized expected
per-customer revenues of the smaller firm and the larger firm are
E
(
R(p∗S)
R
)
=−
(1−Ω) ln(1−Ω)
Ω
(31)
and
E
(
R(p∗L)
R
)
=
1
2
−
(1−Ω) ln(1−Ω)
Ω . (32)
With the case of unit demand, the normalized expected prices of the smaller firm
and the larger firm are
E
(
p∗S
R
)
=−
(1−Ω) ln(1−Ω)
Ω
(33)
and
E
(
p∗L
R
)
=
1
2
−
(1−Ω) ln(1−Ω)
Ω
, (34)
the normalized expected minimum price is
E
(
min
(
p∗L
R
,
p∗S
R
))
=
1−Ω
2Ω
(
2+ (2−3Ω) ln(1−Ω)
Ω
)
, (35)
the normalized expected transaction price is
ET P∗
R
=
3(1−Ω)
3−2Ω , (36)
and the lower bound on normalized prices is
λ ∗L = 1−
N∗S
H
= 1−Ω. (37)
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The lower bound on normalized prices conveys the flavor of these results
well and simply. In the unit-demand case, prices are never less than 1−Ω. Given
that 0 < Ω < 12 , we see that
1
2 < λ ∗L < 1 and in equilibrium normalized prices are
never less than 12 . As
v
R approaches 0, both Ω and the lower bound on the price
support approach 12 . This seems to be an interesting result because in this limit both
advertising and production are costless yet the normalized equilibrium prices are
never less than 12 . The contrast with the standard Bertrand model, where normalized
price would be 0 in equilibrium, is sharp.
In Result 5, normalized per-customer revenues and prices are expressed as
functions of the composite parameter Ω, but Ω is itself completely determined by
the ratio vR . Naturally, each of the normalized per-customer revenues and prices
reported in Result 5 are increasing functions of vR . Table 1 presents detailed results
for the unit-demand case.
4 Choosing Customer Bases with a General Adver-
tising Technology
The incentive to avoid overlap in customer bases drives the asymmetry of the equi-
librium we found in the previous section. The degree of overlap that results from a
particular level of advertising is, in turn, determined by the advertising technology.
This raises an obvious question: what can we say about the set of advertising tech-
nologies that generate the asymmetry result? We will show that asymmetry in the
pure-strategy equilibria of the customer-base game is a very general result.
Let M(N1,N2) denote the overlap associated with an arbitrary advertising
technology. At the most general level, the only a priori restrictions on M(N1,N2)
would seem to be that overlap is non-negative and that overlap is non-decreasing in
the sizes of the customer bases.
Consider the expected profit of firm 1 in the stage-2 price game. In the LT
regime (where N1 < N2), firm 1 is the smaller firm so its stage-2 profit is λ2N1R, and
in the GT regime (where N1 > N2) it is the larger firm so its stage-2 profit is λ1N1R.
Of course, λ1 = 1− M(N1,N2)N1 and λ2 = 1−
M(N1,N2)
N2 , so the stage-2 equilibrium profit
is
Π∗1 =

(
1− M(N1,N2)N2
)
N1R if N1 ≤ N2(
1− M(N1,N2)N1
)
N1R if N1 ≥ N2.
(38)
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Let A(N1) denote firm 1’s advertising cost for a customer base of size N1, and
assume that A(N1) is differentiable. Firm 1’s stage-1 objective function is simply
V1 =

(
1− M(N1,N2)N2
)
N1R−A(N1) if N1 ≤ N2(
1− M(N1,N2)N1
)
N1R−A(N1) if N1 ≥ N2.
(39)
Differentiating V1 with respect to N1 gives us two necessary conditions for the ex-
istence of a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium. The partial derivative of V1 with
respect to N1, evaluated at N1 = N2 = N, must be non-negative in the LT regime and
non-positive in the GT regime:
R −RM(N,N)N −
∂M(N,N)
∂N1
R−A′(N)≥ 0 (40)
R −
∂M(N,N)
∂N1
R−A′(N)≤ 0. (41)
If M(N,N) > 0, it is impossible to satisfy both of these conditions simultaneously.
Result 6. If the advertising technologies used by the firms generate positive over-
lap, there is no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in the customer-base game.
The left-hand-sides of (40) and (41) show clearly that the partial derivative
of Vi with respect to Ni at Ni = N j = N is always smaller on the LT side than on the
GT side as long as M(N,N) > 0 and therefore that Vi is not concave at that point.
The implication of this is that firm i will either choose Ni < N j or Ni > N j as was
the case with our random advertising technology.
While equilibrium customer bases remain asymmetric for any advertising
technology that generates overlap, it seems intuitive that the extent of the asymme-
try of the equilibrium decreases as the advertising technology allows for a better
selection to avoid overlap.
5 Further Insights
In this section we discuss two further issues – the efficiency of the equilibrium
in the stage-1 customer-base game and the incentive for customers to engage in
search. We use a special case of our model where the firms’ advertising technology
is random and consumers have unit demands.
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5.1 Efficiency of Equilibrium in the Customer-Base Game
Since demand is perfectly inelastic with respect to price up to the reservation price
R, the only efficiency issue concerns the number of unique customers in the aggre-
gate customer base. Call this number T (for total). The marginal cost of increasing
the aggregate customer base is just vHH−T since the probability that an additional
draw yields a customer not already in the customer base is H−TH and, therefore, the
expected number of draws needed to uncover someone new is HH−T . To maximize
total surplus, T must be chosen so that this marginal cost is equal to the reservation
price, R, since R is the surplus that is generated when a new person enters the aggre-
gate customer base. Solving this condition we get the optimal size of the aggregate
customer base, T ∗:
T ∗ = H
(
1−
v
R
)
. (42)
Obviously, a monopolist would choose price R for everyone in its customer
base. So to maximize its profit a monopolist would choose its customer base Nm
to equate the marginal cost vHH−Nm to R. Therefore, N
∗
m = T ∗ and we see that the
monopoly equilibrium is efficient. Since the monopolist captures all of the con-
sumer surplus and incurs all of the costs of making customers aware of its product,
this result is not surprising.
What about the duopoly equilibrium? When overlap in the customer bases
is taken into account we see that the number of people in at least one customer base
is
N∗S +N∗L −
N∗S N∗L
H
= HΩ+2ΩH− 2Ω
2H2
H
= H
(
3Ω−2Ω2
)
. (43)
Then a bit of algebra establishes, perhaps surprisingly, that the duopoly equilibrium
is also efficient:
H(3Ω−2Ω2) = T ∗. (44)
Result 7. Both the monopoly and duopoly equilibria are efficient, in the sense that
social welfare is maximized.
We can get some insight into the efficiency result for the duopoly equilib-
rium by working with the first order conditions for the larger firm’s profit-maximizing
problem and the planner’s total surplus-maximizing problem. We show that, given
any permissible NS, the larger firm’s profit-maximizing choice results in an aggre-
gate customer base that is efficient.
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Given NS, to maximize its profit, the larger firm chooses NL to equate the
marginal cost and the marginal revenue of increasing its customer base:
vH
H−NL
=
(
1−
NS
H
)
R. (45)
On the other hand, to maximize social surplus, the planner chooses T to equate the
marginal social cost and the marginal social benefit of increasing the total customer
base:
vH
H −T
= R. (46)
Comparing equations (45) and (46), we see that the larger firm’s marginal revenue is
a fraction
(
1− NSH
)
of the social marginal benefit (R). In light of this, the efficiency
result is somewhat surprising. Notice, however, that the marginal cost of adding
a new person to the larger firm’s customer base is less than the marginal cost of
adding a new person to the total customer base – the number of people who are not
in the larger firm’s customer base (H −NL) is larger than the number who are not
in the total customer base (H−T ), so the larger firm requires fewer draws than the
social planner to add a new person to the relevant customer base. With the random
advertising technology, T = NL +NS− NLNSH . Using this fact, one can show that the
larger firm’s marginal cost is the same fraction
(
1− NSH
)
of the social marginal cost
( vHH−T ); that is (
1−
NS
H
)
vH
H−T
=
vH
H −NL
. (47)
Hence, for any NS, the larger firm’s profit-maximizing choice yields the socially
optimal total customer base.
5.2 Incentive to Search
Our model is motivated by the observation that in some circumstances not all cus-
tomers know of the existence of all firms. Surely this is not an uncommon occur-
rence, so we have modeled the existence-advertising and pricing problems that it
raises. But in the equilibrium of our model some customers have something to gain
by learning about the existence of firms and in this sense these customers have an
incentive to search. Clearly, if customers recognize and act on this incentive the
equilibrium will be upset. This is the issue we discuss here.
The usual set-up found in the search literature involves a large number of
price setting firms and a large number of customers. Customers engage in either
non-sequential search (Stigler, 1961, Burdett and Judd, 1983) or sequential search
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(McCall, 1965, Nelson, 1970, Burdett and Judd, 1983) to locate a low price. The
search costs of customers determine the intensity of the search as well as the price
equilibrium. Common to all these models are the assumptions that customers are
aware of the existence of all firms and the distribution of the prices charged by the
firms but, that in the absence of search, they are unable to match any price in the
distribution with a particular firm. This contrasts sharply with our model where,
through the existence-advertising efforts of firms, some customers become aware
of the existence and price of one of the firms, others become aware of the existence
and price of both firms, and yet others remain unaware of the existence of either
firm. It is not at all clear how to model search in our framework. How does a per-
son go about finding a firm the very existence of which the person is not aware?
How does one calculate the possible gains from finding such a firm? Further, from
our analysis it is quite clear that beyond some point the smaller firm has an incen-
tive to frustrate the attempts of customers to search it out because successful search
generates overlap, and overlap leads to the dissipation of profit through price com-
petition. A more complete model would perhaps include both customer search and
its obstruction by the smaller firm.
Although we are not in a position to formally model customer search, we
can say a little bit about the incentives. In the equilibrium there are four categories
of customers: those who know of the smaller firm but not the larger firm; those
who know of the larger firm but not the smaller firm; those who know of neither
firm; and those who know of both firms. Customers in all but the last category have
something to gain from search. Using Result 5, we can quantify potential gains.
Those who know of neither firm have the most to gain – a successful search that
allowed them to identify one firm would yield a surplus equal to
B0 = R
(
1− ET P
∗
R
)
. (48)
From column B0 in Table 1, we see that this can be as large as .25R, but is a modest
.07R when vR = .5. Those who know of the larger firm but not the smaller one have
the second highest incentive to search – a successful search that allowed them to
identify the smaller firm would yield a surplus equal to
BL = R
(
E
(
p∗L
R
)
−E
(
min( p
∗
L
R
,
p∗S
R
)
))
. (49)
From column BL in Table 1 we see that this could be as large as .2R, but is only
.07R when vR = .5. Finally, we see from column BS in Table 1 that the incentive to
search for those who know only of the smaller firm, equal to
BS = R
(
E
(
p∗S
R
)
−E
(
min( p
∗
L
R
,
p∗S
R
)
))
, (50)
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is no more than .04R. Obviously, if the cost of search is large relative to its expected
benefit there will be no search to upset the equilibrium. This will be the case when
v
R is sufficiently large because the expected benefit of search is inversely related to
v
R and goes to zero as
v
R approaches 1.
Table 1: Normalized expected prices and benefit of search
v
R E
(
p∗S
R
)
E
(
p∗L
R
)
ET P∗
R E
(
min( p
∗
L
R ,
p∗S
R )
)
B0 BL BS
.001 .69 .85 .75 .65 .25 .19 .04
.10 .76 .88 .81 .72 .19 .16 .03
.20 .80 .90 .85 .77 .15 .13 .03
.30 .84 .92 .88 .82 .12 .10 .02
.40 .87 .94 .91 .85 .09 .08 .02
.50 .90 .95 .93 .88 .07 .07 .02
.60 .92 .96 .95 .91 .05 .05 .01
.70 .94 .97 .96 .94 .04 .04 .01
.80 .96 .98 .98 .96 .02 .02 .01
.90 .98 .99 .99 .98 .01 .01 .00
.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 .00 .00
6 Conclusions
We have investigated existence advertising using a two-stage game in which profit-
maximizing firms advertise to manage their customer bases in stage 1 and choose
prices in stage 2. There are two firms and they produce and sell a homogeneous
good.
In the stage-2 price game, as long as one firm has some customers that know
only of it and not of its competitor, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium, but there
is a mixed-strategy equilibrium. When there is imperfect or incomplete overlap
between customer bases, in the mixed-strategy equilibrium both firms randomize
over prices that are strictly above marginal cost. Equilibrium expected prices and
profits are linearly and inversely related to the size of the overlap in the customer
bases.
In the stage-1 customer-base game, as long as the advertising technology
generates any overlap in customer bases there is no symmetric pure-strategy equi-
librium. There are, however, two asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria. Because the
profit of both firms in the stage-2 price equilibrium is negatively affected by over-
lap, the firms have clear incentives to limit advertising as a way of managing overlap
in the customer bases, and this incentive is stronger for the smaller firm. With the
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random advertising technology, the asymmetry in equilibrium customer bases is
pronounced – the larger firm’s customer base is twice that of the smaller firm – and
firms enjoy substantial positive profits. In the special case where customers have
unit demands and the advertising technology is random, the equilibrium is efficient.
A Proof of the Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
Let Πi(pi|Fj) (i ∈ {S,L}, j 6= i) denote firm i’s expected profit, given price pi and
the other firm’s CDF, Fj, and let Π∗i denote the expected equilibrium profit of firm
i. A mixed-strategy equilibrium is characterized by the following properties:
P1: if fi(pi) > 0, then Πi(pi|Fj) = Π∗i
P2: if fi(pi) = 0, then Πi(pi|Fj)≤ Π∗i
P3: if Πi(pi|Fj) < Π∗i , then fi(pi) = 0.
In words: the prices that get positive probability in firm i’s equilibrium density
function all yield profit Π∗i ; all other prices yield an expected profit that is no larger
than Π∗i ; and all prices that yield an expected profit that is less than Π∗i get zero
probability in firm i’s equilibrium density function.
We first establish some useful results based on the assumption that a mixed-
strategy equilibrium exits, and then go on to find one. Notice that for any FS,
ΠL(p,FS)≥ λLNLR, because when pL = p the number of customers who patronize
the larger firm is no smaller that λLNL and revenue per customer is R. This estab-
lishes a lower bound for the larger firm’s profit in any mixed-strategy equilibrium:
Π∗L ≥ λLNLR.
Next we show that p is a lower bound on the support of the larger firm’s
DF. If pL < p, then for any FS, ΠL(pL|FS) < NLR(p) = λLNLR ≤ Π∗L. The strict
inequality follows because the number of customers who patronize the larger firm
is no larger than NL and revenue per customer is less than R(p), the equality fol-
lows from the definition of p, and the weak inequality was established in the pre-
vious paragraph. Property P3 then dictates that, in any mixed-strategy equilibrium,
fL(pL) = 0 for all pL < p.
To establish similar results for the smaller firm, assume that fL(pL) = 0 for
all pL < p, as must be the case in any mixed-strategy equilibrium. Given this as-
sumption, if pS < p, then ΠS(pS|FL) = R(pS)NS, which is strictly increasing in pS.
Notice that the limit of R(pS)NS as pS approaches p from below is R(p)NS = λLNSR,
so Π∗S ≥ λLNSR. Then, from Property P3 we see that in any mixed-strategy equi-
librium, fS(pS) = 0 for all pS < p (since for any such price ΠS(pS|FL) < λLNSR).
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This suggests that there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which Π∗L = λLNLR,
Π∗S = λLNSR, and that the prices that get positive probability are in [p, p].
To prove that the cumulative price density functions in (7) and (8) constitute
a mixed-strategy equilibrium, we must verify that properties P1, P2 and P3 set
out above are satisfied for both firms. We begin with the larger firm. If pL > pS,
the larger firm’s profit is λLNLR(pL) since the customers who know of both firms
choose to buy from the smaller firm. The probability that pL > pS is just FS(pL). On
the other hand, if pL < pS, the larger firm’s profit is NLR(pL) since the customers
who know of both firms now choose to buy from the larger firm, and the probability
that pL < pS is just 1−FS(pL). Since there are no mass points in fS(pS), we can
ignore the case where pL = pS. Then, the larger firm’s expected profit is just
ΠL(pL|FS) = FS(pL)λLNLR(pL)+(1−FS(pL))NLR(pL) for all 0 ≤ pL ≤ p. (51)
It is straightforward to verify the following:
ΠL(pL|FS) = λLNLR for all p ≤ pL ≤ p (52)
ΠL(pL|FS) < λLNLR for all 0 ≤ pL < p. (53)
It is then clear that properties P1, P2 and P3 are satisfied for the larger firm.
Given the mass point in the density function of the larger firm, the smaller
firm’s expected profit given pS and FL is
ΠS(pS|FL) =
{
FL(pS)λSNSR(pS)+(1−FL(pS))NSR(pS) for all 0 ≤ pS < p
1−λL
1−λS λSNSR(pS)+
λL−λS
1−λS
1+λS
2 NSR(pS) for pS = p.
(54)
It is straightforward to verify the following7:
ΠS(pS|FL) = λLNSR for all p ≤ pS < p (55)
ΠS(pS|FL) < λLNSR for pS = p (56)
ΠS(pS|FL) < λLNSR for all 0 ≤ pS < p. (57)
It is then clear that properties P1, P2 and P3 are satisfied for the smaller firm. QED.
B Best-Response Functions
In this appendix we derive the best-response functions expressed in Result 3. First
we arbitrarily restrict firm i to one of the two regimes, and find for each regime a
7The second condition holds with equality if NS = NL.
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restricted best-response function, BRLTi (N j) for the LT regime and BRGTi (N j) for
the GT regime. Then we splice these restricted best-response functions to get the
actual or unrestricted best-response function, BRi(N j).
In the LT regime,
∂Vi(Ni,N j)
∂Ni
=
(
1−
2Ni
H
)
R−
vH
H −Ni
. (58)
Notice that because R > v, ∂Vi(Ni=0,N j)∂Ni > 0, so firm i always chooses Ni > 0. Then,
given the concavity of the objective function within the LT regime, if ∂Vi(Ni=N j,N j)∂Ni ≥
0 firm i’s maximizing choice is Ni = N j, and if
∂Vi(Ni=N j,N j)
∂Ni < 0 firm i’s maximizing
choice is the Ni such that
∂Vi(Ni,N j)
∂Ni = 0, or Ni = ∆1 in (26). The best-response
function for the LT regime is therefore
BRLTi (N j) =
{
N j if N j ≤ ∆1
∆1 if N j > ∆1.
(59)
The maximized objective function for the interior solution (BRLTi (N j) = ∆1) is
V LTi = ∆1
(
1−
∆1
H
)
R− vH[ln(H)− ln(H −∆1)]. (60)
In the GT regime,
∂Vi(Ni,N j)
∂Ni
=
(
1−
N j
H
)
R−
vH
H −Ni
. (61)
Because v > 0, ∂Vi(Ni,N j)∂Ni approaches negative infinity as Ni approaches H, so firm
i always chooses Ni < H. Given the concavity of the GT objective function, if
∂Vi(Ni=N j,N j)
∂Ni ≤ 0 firm i’s maximizing choice is Ni = N j, and if
∂Vi(Ni=N j,N j)
∂Ni > 0 firm
i’s maximizing choice is the Ni such that
∂Vi(Ni,N j)
∂Ni = 0, or Ni = Φ(N j) in (25).
To make further progress in identifying the actual best-response function, it
is useful to define a composite parameter, ∆2:
∆2 ≡ H
(
1−
√
v
R
)
. (62)
∆2 is the value of N j such that
∂Vi(Ni=N j,N j)
∂Ni = 0. The size of ∆2 relative to Φ(N j)
in (25) is easy to establish: when N j < ∆2, ∆2 < φ(N j), when N j > ∆2, ∆2 > φ(N j)
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and when N j = ∆2, ∆2 = φ(N j). A bit of algebra establishes the following useful
inequalities:
0 < ∆1 < ∆2 < H. (63)
The best-response function for the GT regime is now
BRGTi (N j) =
{
N j if N j ≥ ∆2 (or if N j ≥ φ(N j))
Φ(N j) if N j < ∆2 (or if N j ≤ φ(N j)). (64)
The maximized objective function for the interior solution (BRGTi (N j) = Φ(N j)) is
V GTi (N j) = Φ(N j)
(
1−
N j
H
)
R− vH[ln(H)− ln(H −Φ(N j))]. (65)
Now let us splice the restricted best-response functions to get the actual
best-response function, BRi(N j). When N j < ∆1, N j is so small that if forced to be
in the LT regime firm i would choose Ni = N j. But, it will not voluntarily choose
the LT regime, because the non-concavity in Vi(Ni,N j) at Ni = N j means that it
gets an even larger profit by choosing Ni > N j in the interior of the GT regime.
Hence, when N j < ∆1, BRi(N j) = Φ(N j). This case is illustrated in part a of Figure
1 where we have plotted Vi(Ni,N j) holding N j fixed at a value less than ∆1. Notice
that Vi(Ni,N j) has a single local maximum, in the interior of the GT regime, where
Ni = Φ(N j).
When N j > ∆2, the story is similar. In this case, N j is so large that if forced
to be in the GT regime firm i would choose Ni = N j. But, it will not voluntarily
choose the GT regime, because the non-concavity in Vi(Ni,N j) at Ni = N j means
that it gets an even larger profit by choosing Ni = ∆1 < N j in the interior of the LT
regime. Hence, when N j > ∆2, BRi(N j) = ∆1. This case is illustrated in part d of
Figure 1– notice that in this case there is a single local maximum in the interior of
the LT regime.
The situation is a bit trickier when ∆1 ≤ N j ≤ ∆2. In this case, illustrated in
parts b and c of Figure 1, N j is large enough so that Vi(Ni,N j) has a local maximum
in the interior of the LT regime (at Ni = ∆1), and small enough so that it has a
local maximum in the interior of the GT regime (at Ni = Φ(N j)). So BRi(N j) is
either ∆1 in the LT regime, or Φ(N j) in the GT regime, depending on which option
yields the larger payoff. As V LTi in (60) is independent of N j, whereas V GTi (N j) in
(65) is a continuous, decreasing function of N j, and because V GTi (N j) > V LTi when
N j = ∆1 and V GTi (N j) < V LTi when N j = ∆2, we know that there must exists a value
of N j = N˜ such that V GTi (N˜) ≡ V LTi , implicitly defined in (27). There is no closed
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form solution for N˜, but to find the equilibria of the model it is sufficient to know
that
∆1 < N˜ < ∆2. (66)
This completes the splice for firm i: if N j ≤ N˜, firm i’s best response is Φ(N j) in
the GT regime, as in parts a and b of Figure 1, and if N j ≥ N˜, firm i’s best response
is ∆1 in the LT regime, as in parts c and d of Figure 1. QED.
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